Landmark Supreme Court Judgments: Cases and Doctrines

A large part of Indian constitutional law is not written in the Constitution at all; it has been declared by the Supreme Court while deciding cases. Under Article 141 the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India, so a single judgment can change the meaning of an Article for every citizen. Examiners therefore test a fixed set of about twenty judgments: the case name, the year, the Article involved, and the doctrine or principle the court laid down. This note arranges those judgments by the theme they settled.

Why judgments are asked in exams

Questions on this topic are almost always matching questions. A paper gives a case and asks for the doctrine, or gives a doctrine and asks for the case, or asks which amendment a judgment struck down. The second favourite pattern is the chain: a judgment limits Parliament, Parliament replies with an amendment, and the court tests that amendment again. Golaknath followed by the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and Kesavananda Bharati followed by the Forty-second Amendment and Minerva Mills, are the two chains worth memorising completely.

The amending power: from Shankari Prasad to I.R. Coelho

In Shankari Prasad v Union of India (1951) the court held that a constitutional amendment is not ordinary law under Article 13, so the First Amendment was valid. Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan (1965) repeated that view. In I.C. Golaknath v State of Punjab (1967) an eleven-judge bench reversed it by six to five, held that an amendment is law under Article 13 and that fundamental rights cannot be abridged, and applied the doctrine of prospective overruling. Parliament answered with the Twenty-fourth Amendment. The dispute was settled in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, decided on 24 April 1973 by the largest bench ever assembled, thirteen judges, by seven to six: Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution but may not damage its basic structure. Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain (1975) used that doctrine to strike down the clause of the Thirty-ninth Amendment that placed the Prime Minister's election beyond judicial scrutiny. Minerva Mills v Union of India (1980) struck down the clauses of the Forty-second Amendment that had made amendments immune from review, holding judicial review and the balance between fundamental rights and directive principles to be part of the basic structure. Waman Rao v Union of India (1981) fixed 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda, as the cut-off for laws placed in the Ninth Schedule, and I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu (2007) confirmed that laws added to that Schedule after the cut-off can be tested against the basic structure.

Article 21 and personal liberty

In A.K. Gopalan v State of Madras (1950) the court read Article 21 narrowly: any procedure laid down by a valid law was enough. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978), on the impounding of a passport, buried that reading. The procedure must now be just, fair and reasonable, and Articles 14, 19 and 21 are read together as the golden triangle. Later benches filled Article 21 with content: free legal aid and a speedy trial in Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar (1979), the right to livelihood in Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), absolute liability for hazardous industry in M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987), arrest safeguards in D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal (1997), and privacy as a fundamental right in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017), decided unanimously by nine judges. Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act as a disproportionate curb on free speech.

Equality, reservation and social reform

State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan (1951) struck down caste-based reservation in college admissions and forced the First Amendment, which inserted Article 15(4). Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992) upheld reservation for other backward classes but fixed a ceiling of fifty per cent and excluded the creamy layer. M. Nagaraj v Union of India (2006) upheld reservation in promotion subject to conditions. Mohini Jain (1992) and Unni Krishnan (1993) made education a part of the right to life, a reading later written into Article 21A by the Eighty-sixth Amendment. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum (1985) allowed maintenance under the criminal procedure code to a divorced Muslim woman, Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997) laid down guidelines against sexual harassment at the workplace that became a statute in 2013, and Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017) set aside instant triple talaq.

The judiciary and its own appointments

S.P. Gupta v Union of India (1981), the First Judges Case, also widened standing and opened the door to public interest litigation. The Second Judges Case (1993) created the collegium, and the Third Judges Case (1998), an advisory opinion under Article 143, settled its composition. The Fourth Judges Case (2015) struck down the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission, holding judicial independence part of the basic structure. S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994) brought President's rule under Article 356 within judicial review and made the floor of the House the test of a government's majority.

Case, year and principle at a glance

How to revise this topic

• Learn the case with its year and its one-line principle; papers rarely ask anything else.
• Keep the two chains ready: Golaknath to the Twenty-fourth Amendment to Kesavananda, and Kesavananda to the Forty-second Amendment to Minerva Mills.
• Remember the bench strengths that are asked: thirteen in Kesavananda, eleven in Golaknath, nine in Puttaswamy.
• Note which judgments were later turned into statutes, as Vishaka was in 2013 and Shayara Bano in 2019.