President's Powers: Veto, Ordinance and Pardoning Power

The correct answer is C, Article 123. It empowers the President to promulgate an ordinance when Parliament, or either House of it, is not in session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which make immediate action necessary; such an ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament. Option A is wrong because Article 72 is the pardoning power, under which the President may grant pardon, reprieve, respite, remission, suspension or commutation of punishment. Option B is wrong because Article 111 deals with assent to bills passed by both Houses and is the source of the President's veto powers, not of ordinances. Option D is wrong because Article 213 confers the matching ordinance-making power on a Governor in respect of state subjects, and swapping 123 with 213 is the usual error in this question.

The correct answer is B, six weeks. An ordinance must be laid before both Houses when Parliament reassembles, and it ceases to operate on the expiry of six weeks from the date of reassembly, or earlier if both Houses pass resolutions disapproving it. Where the two Houses reassemble on different dates, the six weeks are counted from the later of the two. Option A is wrong because four weeks is not a period mentioned anywhere in Article 123. Option C is wrong because three months has no place in the ordinance scheme either, although it appears in other parts of the Constitution. Option D is wrong because six months is the maximum gap permitted between two sessions of Parliament, and it is this gap plus the six weeks that gives an ordinance its maximum life.

The correct answer is C, six months and six weeks. The arithmetic is worth learning. Article 85 requires that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next, so the longest an ordinance can run before Parliament reassembles is six months; Article 123 then allows it six weeks more from the date of reassembly. Option A is wrong because six weeks is only the period after reassembly, not the whole life of the ordinance. Option B is wrong because the gap between sessions is capped at six months and not at three. Option D is wrong because no ordinance can survive a year without parliamentary approval, and it was precisely the practice of keeping ordinances alive beyond their term by re-issuing them that the Supreme Court struck down.

The correct answer is B, qualified veto. A qualified veto is one that the legislature can override only by a special higher majority, such as two-thirds; it belongs to the American President and not to the Indian one, because when the Indian President returns a bill a simple majority in both Houses is enough to compel assent. Option A is wrong because the absolute veto is available: the President may withhold assent and the bill then dies, as happened with the PEPSU Appropriation Bill of 1954. Option C is wrong because the suspensive veto, the power to return a bill for reconsideration, is available for every bill except a Money Bill. Option D is wrong because the pocket veto is available, no time limit for assent being prescribed by Article 111.

The correct answer is B, the Indian Post Office (Amendment) Bill, 1986, and Zail Singh. The bill, which would have allowed the interception of postal articles, was neither assented to nor returned by President Zail Singh, who simply kept it pending, and it lapsed; this is the standing Indian illustration of a pocket veto. Option A is wrong because the Hindu Code Bill was a matter of political controversy in the early 1950s but was not disposed of by a pocket veto. Option C is wrong because the PEPSU Appropriation Bill of 1954 is the example of an absolute veto, assent having been positively withheld. Option D is wrong because the 1991 bill on the salaries of members of Parliament is also cited as an absolute veto, assent being refused rather than withheld by inaction.

The correct answer is B, a Money Bill. Under Article 111 the President may return a bill for reconsideration only if it is not a Money Bill; for a Money Bill the choice is confined to giving assent or withholding it. The reason is that a Money Bill is introduced in the first place only on the President's own recommendation, so there is nothing left to reconsider. Option A is wrong because an ordinary bill is exactly the kind that may be sent back with a message. Option C is wrong because a private member's bill is an ordinary bill in this respect and can be returned. Option D is wrong because a bill passed at a joint sitting under Article 108 is likewise an ordinary bill and may be returned for reconsideration.

The correct answer is B, Article 72. It empowers the President to grant pardon, reprieve, respite, remission, suspension or commutation of punishment in cases of a sentence by court martial, offences against laws on matters within the Union's executive power, and all cases of a sentence of death. Option A is wrong because Article 61 lays down the procedure for the impeachment of the President for violation of the Constitution. Option C is wrong because Article 143 allows the President to refer a question of law or fact of public importance to the Supreme Court for its opinion, which is an advisory and not a pardoning power. Option D is wrong because Article 161 gives the matching but narrower power to a Governor, who may pardon neither a death sentence nor a court martial sentence.

The correct answer is B, grant a pardon in a case of a death sentence. Article 161 confines the Governor's power to offences against laws on matters to which the state's executive power extends, and it does not extend to pardoning a death sentence, which under Article 72 belongs to the President alone; a Governor also cannot touch a sentence passed by a court martial. Option A is wrong because remitting a sentence of imprisonment is squarely within the Governor's power. Option C is wrong because a respite, meaning a lighter sentence on a special ground such as pregnancy or physical disability, is also available to a Governor. Option D is wrong because commuting rigorous imprisonment to a lighter form of punishment is within the Governor's competence as well.

The correct answer is C, commutation. Commutation changes the nature of the punishment itself, substituting a lighter kind for the one awarded, so that a death sentence becomes imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment becomes simple imprisonment. Option A is wrong because remission reduces only the period of the sentence and leaves its character untouched, as when rigorous imprisonment for two years becomes rigorous imprisonment for one year; this is the commonest confusion in the topic. Option B is wrong because a reprieve is a temporary stay of the execution of a sentence, granted to let a convict pursue a plea for mercy. Option D is wrong because a respite is the award of a lesser sentence on account of a special fact such as pregnancy or physical disability, and not a general substitution.

The correct answer is B, a Constitutional Amendment Bill. The Twenty-fourth Amendment of 1971 made it obligatory for the President to give assent to a bill amending the Constitution, so that neither assent may be withheld nor the bill returned. Option A is wrong because a Money Bill, although it cannot be returned for reconsideration, may still be refused assent, so a veto does exist over it in principle. Option C is wrong because over a state bill reserved by the Governor under Article 200 the President's veto is at its strongest: Article 201 allows assent to be withheld even after the state legislature has passed the bill a second time. Option D is wrong because a financial bill other than a Money Bill is treated like an ordinary bill and can be returned.

The correct answer is B, D. C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, decided in 1987, in which the Court found that Bihar had kept hundreds of ordinances alive for years by re-issuing them without ever placing them before the legislature, and held this to be a fraud on the Constitution. The position was reaffirmed in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar in 2017. Option A is wrong because Kehar Singh, of 1989, concerned the pardoning power under Article 72. Option C is wrong because S. R. Bommai, of 1994, laid down the limits on the use of Article 356 and the imposition of President's rule. Option D is wrong because Maru Ram, of 1980, dealt with remission and the exercise of clemency, not with ordinances.

The correct answer is A, respite. A respite is the award of a lesser sentence than the one originally passed, granted because of some special circumstance personal to the convict, such as pregnancy or serious physical disability, and it is one of the six forms of clemency listed in Article 72. Option B is wrong because a pardon is far wider: it wipes out both the sentence and the conviction, so the convict is treated as though never convicted and all disqualifications fall away. Option C is wrong because a suspension merely holds the operation of the sentence in abeyance for a time without reducing it. Option D is wrong because remission shortens the period of the sentence while keeping its character, and is not tied to any special personal fact of this kind.